Just Courts and Just Men

Personal Justice and Responsibility

The movement of the Oresteia seems to show a historical progression from a heroic ethic to a polis-centered ethic. The move shows the flaws of a system built on personal retributive justice initiated by slights against oneself or family. The Furies, the manifestation of this impulse within the divine pantheon, pursue protagonist after protagonist for enacting what seems to be ethically necessary or divinely commanded. The Agamemnon, which shows the most explicit example of personal retributive justice, almost instinctively triggers a reaction of disgust by what the characters are driven to do. As the trilogy progresses the actions of the characters, bound by this sense of justice, become more abhorrent. By the end of the third book, Athena steps in to implement a system in which justice no longer hinges on the actions of any individual but is delegated to a jury and herself. This third party can rightly distribute the punishment that the hero used to execute but in a manner which does not snowball into generational violence.

While this is often seen as a fantastic development, I want to argue good things are lost when a society has forgotten the personal aspect of justice. It is true that a court can distribute justice more impartially with little personal stake and plethora of experiences to pull from; however, if the individuals within any given society rely merely on a third party to see justice enacted, passivity ensues, individuals fail to take responsibility for the things that they can do, and individuals become unrealistic about the justice the third party can enact.

When Athena decides to establish a court of law in order to judge Orestes, she bases it on the need for greater knowledge, discipline, and righteousness (Eum. 470–490). She understands that the Furies, Orestes, or Apollo are all incapable and compromised to judge themselves or the actions of the other party in any way that would result in a right administration of justice. The knowledge and emotions of the participants blinds them to who they truly are and what they should do. After the arguments are heard, Athena says, “I counsel my citizens to maintain, and practice reverently, a system which is neither archaic nor despotic, and not to cast fear completely out of the city; for what mortal respects justice, if he fears nothing?” (Eum. 696–699). She tells the people present this system will be a bulwark to keep your land and cities safe, it is the institution by which justice rules and peace is maintained.

Of course, in many respects this is a great thing that should be implemented into every city on the peninsula; however, if justice is only seen to be distributed from a third party, individuals in any given society lose a sense of themselves and the responsibility they have for themselves and for the people around them. If justice is giving to others what they are due, then, in a real sense, everyone is called to be an arbiter of justice. Everyone is always making calculations for how to react proportionally to the circumstances around them. Whether it is a jab of humor or an encouragement, every person is moving through the world trying to relate to themselves and to others in proportional ways. To outsource the responsibility an individual bears for knowing how they ought to react to a given situation is a misunderstanding of the individual. More fundamentally the question that must be answered is, what are people due? How does a person actually determine who is due what? On the small things, it seems quite obvious. If a child is crying, they probably need a hug. If a wife is worried, she probably needs a listening ear. A person’s reaction to them is based proportionately on the need that is perceived; I think; this principle goes all the way up to the most grievous of sins. In a real sense, there is an intuitive understanding of what people who commit heinous crimes deserve. I think, and this is probably the most important thing to remember, the ingenuity of the courts is an updated process for what is intuitively understood within personal retributive justice. The justice a court enacts and the justice a person enacts are not two different types of justice. Rather, the process by which justice is enacted is done by a group of impartial judges. It is a better justice not because the justice itself is enacted more purely but because the process by which the judgment comes about is a more stable process. It is not out of the realm of possibility for a person who has had a grievous crime committed against them to correctly perceive themselves, the context, and the facts about the case, then take actions to remedy the situation in a just way. While it is the minority of people who can detach themselves from the situation to judge impartially, it is not unjust in and of itself to do so.

The flourishing polis makes room for both an understanding of the goodness of a judicial system that enacts justice in an impartial way and also gives enough room for individuals who have the right disposition to act justly and administer justice within the realm of their sovereignty. A third party should not be involved in every marital dispute, nor should there be a social worker present every time a parent needs to deal with a child. Obviously, at least on the level of the family, justice can be enacted between two individuals. It takes maturity, wisdom, and prudence, but this does not mean it cannot happen. The man who was unable to carry prudent justice, lives in a place in which the third-party justice has become overreaching. Alternatively, a man who can kill his daughter and only faces the consequences of his actions by a crazed wife lives in a society which places too much emphasis on the individual for carrying out the requirements of justice. In any society, there must be a real understanding that justice can be carried out on a personal level without the fear, if done rightly, of a third party coming and rehashing the matter. However, in the same society, there must be a means by which justice can be enacted apart from that individual because of human frailty and their tendency to get caught up in the emotion of the event.